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Abstract
This paper is the +rst part of a work whose purpose is to investigate duality in some related
frameworks (cartesian closed categories, lambda-calculi, intuitionistic and classical logics) from
syntactic, semantical and computational viewpoints. We start with category theory and we show
that any bicartesian closed category with coexponents is degenerated (i.e. there is at most one
arrow between two objects). The remainder of the paper is devoted to logical issues. We exam-
ine the propositional calculus underlying the type system of bicartesian closed categories with
coexponents and we show that this calculus corresponds to subtractive logic: a conservative ex-
tension of intuitionistic logic with a new connector (subtraction) dual to implication. Eventually,
we consider +rst-order subtractive logic and we present an embedding of classical logic into
subtractive logic. c© 2001 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
0. Introduction
This paper is the +rst part of a work whose purpose is to investigate duality in
some related frameworks (cartesian closed categories, lambda-calculi, intuitionistic and
classical logics) from syntactic, semantical and computational viewpoints.
It is rather natural to begin with category theory where duality is a built-in concept.
Indeed, to any categorical notion corresponds immediately a dual notion. In particular,
we give the de+nition of a coexponent, dual notion of the exponent of cartesian closed
categories (CCC). This leads then to the de+nition of a bi-[CCC] (i.e. a CCC whose
dual is also a CCC). This structure seems to be studied for the +rst time by Filinski
[8] within the framework of functional languages semantics.
From a logical standpoint, if we consider the symmetrical categorical propositional
calculus underlying the axiomatics of bi-[CCC], we easily show that this calculus
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corresponds to the logic studied by Rauszer [19, 20] (let us call it subtractive logic).
This logic is a conservative extension of propositional intuitionistic logic with a new
connective (subtraction) dual to implication. It is interesting to notice that subtraction
allows to de+ne a “weak negation” for which the excluded-middle law holds (but
not the contradiction law). We will prove that subtraction is not de+nable from weak
negation.
Moreover, we will see that topological and Kripke semantics of subtractive propo-
sitional logic are the same as in intuitionistic logic and simpler in the +rst-order
framework (however, in this framework subtractive logic is no longer conservative
over intuitionistic logic since the axiom scheme called DIS is provable). Duality also
allows to de+ne a very simple embedding of classical logic into subtractive logic.
This paper is organized as follows: the +rst section deals with category theory
whereas the remainder of the paper is devoted to logical issues (Sections 2–4 are inde-
pendent of Section 1). We show in the +rst section that any bi-[CCC] is degenerated
(there is at most one arrow between two objects). As a corollary we obtain that, in the
category of sets and total functions, the coexponent of two sets is in general not de+ned.
In Section 2, we de+ne a symmetrical categorical propositional calculus and we show
that this calculus corresponds to C. Rauszer’s subtractive propositional logic [19, 20].
We give a direct proof of conservativity over intuitionistic logic using Kripke semantics.
Then we prove that the deduction theorem does not hold in the symmetrical categorical
propositional calculus (and consequently, there is no functionnal completeness in bi-
[CCC]). To round oG this section, we extend the work of Rauszer with some new
properties of subtractive logic (mainly non-de+nability results).
In Section 3, we examine why +rst-order subtractive logic is no longer conservative
over intuitionistic logic although it is conservative over DIS-logic (which is also called
Constant Domain Logic in the literature).
In Section 4, we extend Gentzen’s sequent calculus LK with subtraction (we thus
obtain SLK) and then we restrict this (classical) calculus to subtractive logic. Eventu-
ally, we de+ne a simple embedding of classical logic into subtractive logic and then
we show how to translate cut-free proofs of LK.
1. Bi-CCC with coexponents
This structure seems to be studied for the +rst time by Filinski [8] within the frame-
work of functional languages semantics. Filinski shows that duality in bi-[CCC] may
be interpreted in an elegant way as a duality between values and continuations. He
builds for that purpose a symmetrical -calculus in which continuations can be explic-
itly handled (as well as values). Then, he extends Lambek and Scott’s well-known
theorem which expresses the equivalence between CCC and simply typed -calculus
[14]. However, to obtain functional completeness in bi-[CCC] (i.e. the property which
states the ability to simulate -abstraction), Filinski is led to extend the axiomatics of
bi-[CCC] by adding a new morphism (and its dual).
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Surprisingly, from a logical standpoint, the type of this morphism is a generalisation
of the excluded-middle axiom. We will prove in Section 2 that this extension to clas-
sical logic is already justi+ed by logical arguments: the deduction theorem does not
hold in the symmetrical categorical propositional calculus, while adding it as a rule
yields classical logic.
We will here con+ne ourselves to the theory of bi-[CCC] (without additional mor-
phism). We +rst recall the de+nition of a category and how duality is expressed in
category theory. Then we show that any bi-[CCC] is degenerated (there is at most one
arrow between two objects), although this snag was hitherto closely related to classical
logic. As a corollary we obtain that, in the category of sets and total functions, the
coexponent of two sets is in general not de+ned (more speci+cally, we will show that
in fact it is de+ned if and only if either one set or the other is empty).
1.1. Categories
A directed graph is a structure G consisting of a collection of objects and a col-
lection of arrows together with two applications, called source and target, which
both assign an object to any arrow. A category may be de+ned as a directed graph
with some extra structure: a unary application Id : objects(C)→ arrows(C) such that:
source(IdA) = target(IdA) = A for any A of objects(C) and a partial binary function
◦ : arrows(C) × arrows(C) → arrows(C), which is de+ned on (g; f) if and only if
target(f) = source(g), and such that target(g ◦ f) = target(g) and source(g ◦ f) =
source(f). Moreover, these applications must satisfy:
• f ◦ IdA = IdB ◦ f=f, for any f : A→B.
• (h ◦ g) ◦ f= h ◦ (g ◦ f), for any f : A→B, g : B→C and h : C→D
Notation. For any category C, we will denote by C[A; B] the set of arrows (or mor-
phisms) whose source is A and whose target is B.
Denition 1.1. Let C be a category, an arrow i : A→B is an isomorphism if there is
an arrow j : B → A such that j ◦ i= IdA and i ◦ j= IdB. The objects A and B are then
called isomorphic.
1.1.1. Dual category
Given a category C, one can de+ne its dual category, denoted C⊥, in the following
way: the objects of C⊥ are the objects of C, the arrows of C⊥ are the arrows of C and
the applications source and target of C⊥ are, respectively, the application target and
source of C. In other words, the arrows of C⊥ are obtained by inverting the arrows
of C, that can also be stated as C⊥[A; B] ≡ C[B; A]. We will denote by f⊥ the arrow
of C⊥ obtained by inverting some arrow f of C. The identity in C⊥ is the same
as in C. The composition of two arrows f⊥ : B→A and g⊥ : C→B is de+ned by
f⊥ ◦g⊥=(g◦f)⊥ : C→A. (Notice that this duality is involutive, i.e. for any category
C, (C⊥)⊥=C:)
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1.2. Applying duality
Let us +rst recall familiar constructions of a bicartesian category: +nal and initial
objects, product and coproduct (see [1] for instance). They correspond, respectively,
to the set-theoretical notions of singleton and empty set, cartesian product and disjoint
union. Then we consider the construction dual to the exponent.
1.2.1. Final and initial objects
Denition 1.2. In a category C, an object  is 6nal if for any object A of C, there
is a unique arrow in C[A;] (we denote by A : A→ this unique arrow).
Denition 1.3. In a category C, an object ⊥ is initial if for any object A of C, there
is a unique arrow in C[⊥; A] (we denote by A : ⊥→A this unique arrow).
1.2.2. Product and coproduct
Denition 1.4. In any category C, given two objects A and B an object, we call product
of A and B an object, denoted by A×B, together with two arrows A;B : A×B→A and
′A;B : A× B→B which satisfy this property: for any object C, any arrows f : C→A
and g : C→B, there is a unique arrow h : C→A× B such that the following diagram
commutes:
We denote by 〈f; g〉 this unique h.
Denition 1.5. A category in which any pair of objects admits a product is called a
cartesian category.
Denition 1.6. In any category C, we call coproduct of two objects A and B an object,
denoted by A ⊕ B, together with two arrows A;B : A→A ⊕ B and ′A;B : B→A ⊕ B
which satisfy this property: for any object C, any arrows f : A→C and g : B→C,
there is a unique arrow h : A⊕ B→C such that the following diagram commutes:
We denote by [f; g] this unique h.
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Notation. Given two arrows f :A→C and g :B→D of C, as usual, we denote by
f×g the arrow (unique by de+nition of C×D) 〈f◦A;B; g◦′A;B〉 :A×B→C×D and
f⊕ g the arrow (unique by the de+nition of A⊕B) [C;D ◦f; ′C;D ◦ g] :A⊕B→C⊕D.
Denition 1.7. A cartesian category in which any pair of objects admits a coproduct
is called a bicartesian category.
1.2.3. Exponents
Given two sets A and B, let us denote by BA the set of applications from A to B.
For any set C, any application from C × A to B corresponds in a bijective way (by
curry+cation) to some application from C to BA. The following de+nition generalizes
this concept with a generic cartesian category.
Denition 1.8. In any cartesian category C, we call exponent of two objects A and
B an object, denoted by BA, together with an arrow jA;B : BA × A→B which satisfy
the following property: for any object C, any arrow f : C × A→B, there is a unique
arrow h : C→BA such that the next diagram commutes:
We denote by f? this unique h.
Remark. Intuitively, the object BA represents the set of morphisms of C[A; B], j cor-
responds to evaluation and ? to curry+cation. Just as in the category of sets, we can
show that the operation f → f? is a bijection between the set of arrows from C × A
to B and the set of arrows from C to BA. In other words (denoting the set-theoretic
bijection by ≈)
C[C × A; B]≈C[C; BA]:
Denition 1.9. A cartesian (resp. bicartesian) category in which any pair of objects
admits an exponent is called a cartesian (resp. bicartesian) closed category.
1.2.4. Coexponents
Applying duality again, it is possible to give a de+nition of coexponents. Namely,
the coexponent of two objects A and B of a bicartesian category C can be obtained
by taking the exponent of A and B in C⊥ (if it exists) and then inverting jA;B (which
is an arrow of C⊥). We do not give any intuition of it because we will see that this
de+nition does not correspond to any set-theoretic notion (see Corollary 1.15).
Denition 1.10. In any bicartesian category C, we call coexponent of two objects A
and B an object, denoted by BA, together with an arrow A;B: B→BA⊕A which satisfy
156 T. Crolard / Theoretical Computer Science 254 (2001) 151–185
this property: for any object C, any arrow f :B→C ⊕ A, there is a unique arrow
h : BA→C such that the following diagram commutes:
We denote by f? this unique h.
Denition 1.11. A bicartesian closed category in which any pair of objects admits a
coexponent is called a bi-[cartesian closed ] category.
Notation. To avoid any confusion, we will shorten bi-[cartesian closed] category in bi-
[CCC] since bi-CCC is the abbreviation generally used for bicartesian closed category
(i.e. with coproducts but without coexponents).
A bi-[CCC] is a CCC whose dual is also a CCC (and thus a bi-[CCC]). A natural
question is then: Does there exist non-trivial such structures?. The answer is no since
any bi-[CCC] is degenerated (i.e. there is at most one arrow between two objects).
1.3. Any bi-[CCC] is degenerated
It is known that any CCC provided with an involution is degenerated (see
[11, Appendix B]). In a more general way, any attempt to extend the theory of CCC
to the interpretation of classical logic results in the same pitfall [14, 22]. We show here
that this phenomenon appears already within the intuitionistic framework (see Theorem
2.13). For that we will need Joyal’s theorem (see [14, p. 67]).
Lemma 1.12. In any CCC, if ⊥ is an initial object then (⊥× A) too.
Proof. Indeed, because C[(⊥×A); B] ≈ C[⊥; BA] (see the remark following De+nition
1.8).
Theorem 1.13 (Joyal). In any CCC; if ⊥ is initial and if C[A;⊥] is non-empty then
A is initial.
Proof. Let us show that A is isomorphic to ⊥×A. If f is an arrow of C[A;⊥], then the
inverse morphisms between f and ⊥×A are 〈f; IdA〉 : A→⊥×A and ′⊥; A :⊥×A→A.
Indeed, ′⊥; A◦〈f; IdA〉= IdA (by de+nition of the product) and 〈f; IdA〉◦′⊥; A = Id⊥×A
since ⊥× A is initial (by Lemma 1.12).
Theorem 1.14. Any bi-[CCC ] is degenerated: there is at most one arrow between
two objects.
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Proof. In all CCC, since × B is isomorphic to B,
C[B; A] ≈ C[(× B); A] ≈ C[; AB]
and thus by duality:
C[A; B] ≈ C[A; (⊥⊕ B)] ≈ C[AB;⊥]
then by Joyal’s theorem (since ⊥ is initial), C[AB;⊥] contains at most one arrow.
As a direct corollary, we know that in the category of sets, the coexponent of two
sets is not always de+ned. This corollary is obvious since the category of sets is clearly
not degenerated. It is, nevertheless, possible to be more speci+c. Let us recall +rst that
in any cartesian category, if  is +nal, the exponents B and A are de+ned for
any objects A; B (take B=B with j; B = B; and A = with jA;=×A). By
duality, in any bicartesian category, if ⊥ are initial, the coexponents B⊥ and ⊥A are
always de+ned for any objects A; B (take B⊥=B with ⊥; B = B;⊥ and ⊥A =⊥ with
A;⊥ = ⊥⊕A). We will show that, in the category of sets, the coexponent is de+ned
only in these two cases:
Proposition 1.15. In the category of sets; the coexponent BA of two sets A and B is
de6ned if and only if A= ∅ or B= ∅.
Proof. We know that, since ∅ is initial in the bicartesian closed category of sets, B∅
and ∅A are de+ned for any A; B. Let us assume now that A and B are not empty but
that BA is de+ned nonetheless. That means, in particular, that A;B is interpreted by a
total function from B to BA⊕A. This function chooses, for each element b of B, a side
of BA ⊕ A. But this function must satisfy the following property: for any set C and
any application f from B to C ⊕A, (f?⊕ IdA)◦ A;B =f. But since f?⊕ IdA leaves
the side unchanged, it is enough to take some non-empty set C and some function
f which chooses in b a side diGerent from A;B and the property is not satis+ed any
longer, hence the contradiction.
Remark. In this proof, we do not use the uniqueness of f?. Consequently in the
category of sets, the weak coexponent (i.e. without this property of uniqueness) of two
sets A and B is de+ned, for the same reason as above, if and only if A= ∅ or B= ∅.
1.4. No functional completeness
Functional completeness is the main result that makes possible to prove the equiva-
lence between CCC and simply typed lambda-calculus (see [14, p. 61]): this expresses
the de+nability of -abstraction from categorical combinators. Informally, it can be
stated as follows: if given a hypothetical arrow x : →A it is possible to build an
arrow (x) : →B, then there is an arrow f : A→B such that f ◦ x=(x).
A formal statement requires to de+ne the polynomial category to which belongs the
term (x). This formalism will not be necessary to show that this property does not
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hold in bi-[CCC]. Indeed, we will show that there does not exist any arrow f : A→B
such that f◦x=(x), by showing that sometimes, there exists no arrow of type A→ B
at all.
More formally, the result of functional completeness admits a corollary in the logic
de+ned by the typing rules of CCC. It is this corollary, called deduction theorem in
[14] (p. 51), expressed in the logic corresponding to bi-[CCC], that we will disprove
in Section 2.5.
On the other hand, by adding two new morphisms typed, respectively, by (B ⊕
C)A→BA⊕C and its dual B×CA→ (B×C)A and some equations which de+ne them,
it is possible of recover functional completeness [8]. It is surprising to notice that the
logical interpretation of the type of the +rst morphism, A ⇒ (B ∨ C)  (A ⇒ B) ∨ C,
is a generalization of the excluded-middle axiom. We will see in Section 2.5 that
this extension to classical logic had to happen, since it arises from the deduction
theorem.
2. Subtractive logic
Any degenerated category corresponds exactly to a preorder. Namely, the existence
of an arrow between two objects indicates if they are comparable. ReOexivity is given
by the identity and transitivity by the composition. Conversely, any preorder can be
seen as a degenerated category.
Since bi-[CCC] are degenerated, they are special preorders: the constructions of a
cartesian closed category de+ne a Heyting pre-algebra (see [23, p. 259]), their dual
constructions de+ne a Brouwer pre-algebra (see [4, p. 162]), and +nally the whole
constructions de+ne a Heyting–Brouwer pre-algebra (see [19, p. 220]).
On the other hand, it is possible (see [14, p. 47]) to present the theory of CCC (resp.
with initial object, co-product) as a type system. If we remove all that deal with arrows
in this type system, we obtain a deduction system for the minimal propositional calculus
(resp. intuitionistic, with disjunction). This point of view extends to the calculus with
co-exponents, that we will denote from now on “−” and call subtraction (terminology
which seems to be due to Skolem, see [4, p. 144]).
2.1. A symmetrical categorical propositional calculus
The formulas are built from the usual connectives and subtraction.
Identity axioms
A  A
Cut rule
A  B B  C
A  C
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Axioms for ⊥ and 
⊥  A A  
Left intro. axiom and right intro. rule of ∧
A ∧ B  A A ∧ B  B C  A C  B
C  A ∧ B
Left intro. rule and right intro. axiom for ∨
A  C B  C
A ∨ B  C A  A ∨ B B  A ∨ B
Left intro. axiom and right intro. rule of ⇒
(B⇒A) ∧ BA C ∧ BA
C B⇒A
Left intro. rule and right intro. axiom for −
AB ∨ C
A− C B A (A− B) ∨ B
Remark. In this system, one can derive the sequent A∧¬BA− B (where ¬B is the
usual intuitionistic negation B⇒⊥):
A (A− B) ∨ B ¬B¬B
A ∧ ¬B ((A− B) ∨ B) ∧ ¬B×
A ∧ ¬B (A− B) ∨ (B ∧ ¬B) 
A− BA− B
B ∧ ¬B⊥ ⊥A− B
B ∧ ¬BA− B
(A− B) ∨ (B ∧ ¬B)A− B
A ∧ ¬BA− B
where  is the distributivity law (the proof of which is given in the example below)
and × is the following derived rule:
A ∧ BA AC
A ∧ BC
A ∧ BB BD
A ∧ BD
A ∧ BC ∧ D
The converse sequent A−BA∧¬B is not derivable (see Section 2.9) but it becomes
derivable in the presence of the excluded-middle axiom, expressed here as the sequent
¬B ∨ B:
AA ∨ B
A− BA
A ¬B ∨ B
A¬B ∨ B
A− B¬B
A− BA ∧ ¬B
The equivalence, in classical logic, between A − B and A ∧ ¬B thus justi+es the use
of subtraction symbol (A− B means A and not B and may be read A without B or A
minus B). Moreover, in the usual (classical) interpretation of propositional connectives
in the Boolean algebra made up of subsets of a set, the subtraction is interpreted as
expected by the set-theoretic diGerence.
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Denition 2.1. We call symmetrical categorical propositional calculus the previous set
of deduction rules (the calculus without the rules for subtraction is called categorical
propositional calculus).
Remark. It is known (see [14, p. 47]) that the categorical propositional calculus cor-
responds to intuitionistic logic. It is clear by construction that the symmetrical calculus
corresponds to Heyting–Brouwer algebras. We will call this logic propositional sub-
tractive logic (we will show in Theorem 2.13 that this logic is conservative over
propositional intuitionistic logic).
In this deduction system, each connective admits a dual connective (;∧; ⇒ are
respectively dual of ⊥, ∨,−). We can then map any propositional formula A to a
formula PA obtained by replacing each connective of A by its dual (and by switching
the arguments if the connective is − or ⇒ , since from a syntactic viewpoint, the
connective dual to − is actually ⇐ ). The duality thus de+ned on formulas does
not match with duality in classical Boolean logic (represented by negation). Indeed,
atoms are unchanged by this translation: we will thus call it “pseudo-duality” (it is,
nevertheless, possible to supplement this pseudo-duality by giving a duality on atoms
[2]). It is easily checked that this pseudo-duality is involutive, i.e. for any formula,
(A)=A and we can show the following property:
Proposition 2.2. If a sequent AB is derivable; then the sequent BA is also deriv-
able.
Proof. It is clear that for each connective, the left (resp. right) introduction rule is dual
to the right (resp. left) introduction of the its dual connective. This makes it possible to
map any instance of a rule to its pseudo-dual instance and the pseudo-dual derivation
of some derivation of AB is of course a proof of BA.
Example. We give now the proofs of some distributivity laws. These laws are in-
teresting since they are not satis+ed in a generic lattice, so we need implication or
subtraction to prove them (see Section 4.2.1). Implication permits to directly derive
this +rst law as follows:
B ∧ C B ∧ C
B ∧ C  (B ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧ A)
C B⇒ ((B ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧ A))
B ∧ AB ∧ A
B ∧ A (B ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧ A)
AB⇒ ((B ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧ A))
C ∨ AB⇒ ((B ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧ A))
B ∧ (C ∨ A)B ∧ (B⇒ ((B ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧ A)))
B ∧ (C ∨ A) (B ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧ A)
(the last two rules that occur above do not belong to the categorical calculus, but are
easily derived). Subtraction makes it possible to prove directly this second distributivity
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law (which is however an intuitionistic theorem and thus provable without subtraction):
B ∨ C B ∨ C
(B ∨ C) ∧ (B ∨ A)B ∨ C
((B ∨ C) ∧ (B ∨ A))− BC
B ∨ AB ∨ A
(B ∨ C) ∧ (B ∨ A)B ∨ A
((B ∨ C) ∧ (B ∨ A))− BA
((B ∨ C) ∧ (B ∨ A))− BC ∧ A
(((B ∨ C) ∧ (B ∨ A))− B) ∨ BB ∨ (C ∧ A)
(B ∨ C) ∧ (B ∨ A)B ∨ (C ∧ A)
2.2. Bi-topological semantics
A well-known semantics for intuitionistic propositional calculus consists in topolog-
ical models. It is, in fact, a subclass of Heyting algebras which is suQcient to obtain
a completeness theorem. We +rst recall topological semantics, then we present an ex-
tension of this semantics allowing to interpret subtraction (following Rauszer [19]).
2.2.1. Topological models
We begin with the de+nition of a topological space, as well as the usual concept of
interior.
Denition 2.3. A topological space is given by a set X and a collection O of subsets
of X containing ∅ and X , and closed under +nite intersection and unspeci+ed union.
Any element S of O is called an open set and its complement, denoted by Sc, is a
closed set of the topological space.
Denition 2.4. Given any topological space O on X , and any subset S of X , the
interior of S, denoted by int(S), is the union of all open sets included in S (hence the
largest open subset of S).
We can now recall the topological semantics of a propositional formula. Each formula
is interpreted by an open set.
Denition 2.5. Given a topological space O on X , an assignment V which maps each
propositional atom to an open set, we de+ne the interpretation <A= of a formula A by
induction:
• <A= ≡V(A) if A is a propositional atom;
• <= ≡ X; <⊥= ≡ ∅;
• <A ∧ B= ≡ <A=∩ <B=;
• <A ∨ B= ≡ <A=∪ <B=;
• <A⇒B= ≡ int(<A=c ∪ <B=):
A sequent AB is valid in O iG <A=⊂ <B=.
Notation. To avoid any ambiguity, we will denote by <A=VO (i.e. the topological space
is denoted as a subscript and the assignment as a superscript).
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Theorem 2.6 (Completeness and soundness). A propositional formula is provable in
intuitionistic logic if and only if it is valid in any topological model (resp. 6nite
model).
Proof. See [23, p. 246], for instance.
2.2.2. Bi-topological models
To interpret implication in topological spaces, we used the concept of interior, which
exists because the collection of open sets is closed under unspeci+ed union. We would
like subtraction, which is the connective dual to implication, to have a dual semantics.
Unfortunately, the dual of a topological space (de+ned as the collection of its closed
sets) is not a topological space since it is not closed under unspeci+ed union but under
unspeci+ed intersection (it is in fact an instance of Brouwer algebras). A simple way
to overcome this problem is to use bi-topological spaces, i.e. closed under unspeci+ed
union and unspeci+ed intersection.
Denition 2.7. A bi-topological space is given by a set X and a collection O of subsets
of X containing ∅ and X , and closed under unspeci+ed intersection and unspeci+ed
union.
Denition 2.8. Given a bi-topological space O on X , and a subset S of X , the exterior
of S, denoted by ext(S), is the intersection of all the open sets containing X (hence
the smallest open set containing S).
Remark. For any set X , complementation de+nes a well-known duality on P(X ) con-
sidered as a Boolean algebra. This duality extends to bi-topological spaces, the dual of
(X;O) being (X;O⊥) where O⊥ is de+ned by:
O⊥= {Sc: S ∈O}:
The concept of exterior is then dual to the concept of interior since for any set S of
P(X ):
(intO⊥(S
c))c = extO(S);
since (intO⊥(Sc))c is the intersection of closed sets of O⊥ (i.e. open sets of O) which
contain S, in other words extO(S).
2.2.3. Semantics of subtraction
We are now able to extend the topological interpretation to formulas involving sub-
traction. First of all let us notice that the semantics of connectives is de+ned indepen-
dently of the assignment (as a function from O× O to O for the connectives ∧;∨; ⇒
and as elements of O for ;⊥). Indeed, for any open S; T of O:
• <=O=X , <⊥=O= ∅;
• < ∧ =O(T; S)=T ∩ S;
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• < ∨ =O(T; S)=T ∪ S;
• <⇒ =O(T; S)= int(T c ∪ S):
The (0-ary) connectives  and ⊥ are dual (i.e. <⊥=⊥O = <=O) since the following
equation holds:
(<=O)c = <=O⊥ :
In the same way, the (binary) connectives ∧ and ∨ are dual (i.e. < ∧ =⊥O = < ∨ =O) since
the following equation holds:
(< ∧ =O(S; T ))c = < ∨ =O⊥(T c; Sc):
We naturally expect subtraction and implication semantics also to be dual, which is
stated by the equation <⇐ =⊥O = < − =O. Consequently, for any open S; T of O,
(< − =O(S; T ))c = <⇒ =O⊥(T c; Sc):
Namely,
(< − =O(S; T ))c = intO⊥((T c)c ∪ Sc)= (intO⊥(T c ∩ S)c)= (extO(T c ∩ S))c;
we thus obtain the following bi-topological semantics for subtraction:
<A−B= ≡ ext(<A=∩ <B=c):
Before studying in detail properties of bi-topological semantics, it is natural to raise
the following question: Does there exist non-trivial instance of bi-topological spaces?.
The answer is yes since there are bi-topological spaces which are not Boolean algebras
(in a Boolean algebra every open set is also a closed set). A bi-topological space is,
however, degenerated since it always consists of the +nal sections of some preorder.
This theorem is a well-known result in topology (see [3, p. 48]):
Theorem 2.9. A topological space (X;O) is bi-topological if and only if O is the set
of all 6nal sections (or initial sections) of some preorder on X .
Proof. It is easy to see that the set of all +nal sections of a preorder on X is a
bi-topological space on X . Conversely, we de+ne the following relation on X :
x6y ≡ ∀S ∈O(x∈ S⇒y∈ S):
This relation is clearly reOexive and transitive, it is thus a preorder. Let us show that
the +nal sections of this preorder are exactly the open sets of O. By de+nition of the
preorder, any open set is a +nal section. Let us consider now a +nal section S of
the preorder and show that S is an open set. We denote by V (x) the intersection of all
the open sets which contains x. It is clear that if y∈V (x) then y¿x because any open
set containing x contains V (x) and thus y. Consequently, for any x∈ S, V (x)⊂ S. We
conclude that S =
⋃
x∈S V (x) is open.
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Remark. In the bi-topological space de+ned by a preorder (X;6), the interior of a
subset E of X , which is the largest +nal section included in E, can be de+ned by
x∈ int(E) iG ∀y¿x(y∈E):
and by duality, the exterior of a set, which is the smallest +nal section containing E,
can be de+ned by
x∈ ext(E) iG ∃y6x(y∈E):
2.3. Kripke’s forcing
We consider now the extension of Kripke semantics to subtractive logic (following
Rauszer [19]). We have shown that any bi-topological space is composed of the +nal
sections of a preorder. However, there is an interpretation of intuitionistic logic whose
models (due to Kripke) are exactly preorders together with a forcing relation (denoted
) between the nodes of the preorder and the formulas. This relation must satisfy
the following property: when a node “forces” a formula, then any greater node also
forces the formula. This monotony property just says that formulas are interpreted by
+nal sections of the preorder. We will see that Kripke’s forcing corresponds exactly
to the bi-topological interpretation of the previous section. Let us give +rst the formal
de+nition of a Kripke model (notice that we do not con+ne ourselves to trees, see the
remark following Corollary 2.19).
Denition 2.10. A Kripke model is given by a preorder (E;6) and an assignment
V which maps any propositional atom to a +nal section of the preorder. The forcing
relation is de+ned for any node  by induction on formulas:
•   A ≡ ∈V(A), if A is a propositional atom
•    and   ⊥
•   (A ∨ B) ≡   A or   B
•   (A ∧ B) ≡   A and   B
•   (A⇒B) ≡ for any ¿ (  A implies   B)
Proposition 2.11. Given a preorder (E;6) and an assignment V which maps any
propositional atom to a 6nal section of the preorder; then for any node  and any
formula A:
  A i@ ∈ <A=;
where <A= is the interpretation of A in the bi-topological space de6ned by (E;6).
Proof. By induction, the only non-trivial case being the case of implication. If we
consider that the connectives are classically interpreted in the meta-language then using
the induction hypothesis we get
(  A implies   B) iG (  A or   B) iG ∈ <A=c ∪ <B=:
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By de+nition,   (A⇒B) ≡ for any ¿ (  A implies   B), and consequently:
  (A⇒B) iG ∈ int(<A=c ∪ <B=)
by the remark following Theorem 2.9.
2.3.1. Semantics of subtraction
Since a Kripke model is exactly a bi-topological model, the semantics of subtraction
is then de+ned by
  (A− B) iG ∈ ext(<A=∩ <B=c):
We thus obtain the following Kripke semantics of subtraction:
  (A− B) ≡ exists 6 (  A and   B):
Proposition 2.11 extends then by duality to subtraction. In other words, Kripke models
always allow to interpret subtraction: conservativity over intuitionistic propositional
logic arises from this property.
2.4. Conservativity over intuitionistic logic
We are now able to show the conservativity of propositional subtractive logic over
propositional intuitionistic calculus.
Lemma 2.12 (Soundness). Any formula provable in the symmetrical categorical
propositional calculus is valid in any Kripke model.
Proof. Let us consider a formula provable in the symmetrical categorical propositional
calculus. This formula is valid in any Heyting–Brouwer algebra, and in particular in
any bi-topological model (i.e. in any Kripke model).
Theorem 2.13 (Conservativity). Any formula containing no subtraction provable in
the symmetrical categorical propositional calculus is provable in intuitionistic logic.
Proof. Let us consider a formula provable in the symmetrical categorical propositional
calculus. By Lemma 2.12, this formula is valid in any Kripke model. The completeness
theorem for Kripke models (see [23, p. 254]) allows us to conclude that this sequent
is provable in intuitionistic logic.
The work of Rauszer [19] enables us to close this section with the completeness
theorem for (+nite) Kripke models.
Theorem 2.14 (Completeness). Any formula valid in any Kripke model (resp. 6nite
model) is provable in the symmetrical categorical propositional calculus.
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Proof. By the completeness theorem of Rauszer (see [19, p. 244]), any valid formula
valid in all +nite Kripke models is valid in all Heyting–Brouwer algebras. The result
is then obtained by applying the completeness theorem for these algebras.
2.5. No deduction theorem
We show here that the deduction theorem, which holds in the categorical proposi-
tional calculus, does not hold any longer in the symmetrical categorical propositional
calculus. First of all, let us recall the statement of this theorem:
Theorem 2.15. In the categorical propositional calculus; for any propositional formu-
las A and B; if there is a derivation of B in which any leaf is either an axiom;
or a sequent A; then there exists a derivation in this calculus of AB (in which
all leaves are axioms).
Proof. See [14, p. 51].
To show that this theorem does not hold any more in the symmetrical categorical
propositional calculus, we show that in the presence of subtraction, this theorem allows
to derive the excluded-middle axiom. For that, we will need the following lemma
(where ¬A stands for A⇒⊥):
Lemma 2.16. For any propositional formula A; the sequent ¬(A∨¬A)⊥ is derivable
in intuitionistic logic.
Proof. Here is a proof in the categorical propositional calculus:
¬(A ∨ ¬A) ∧ A¬(A ∨ ¬A)
AA ∨ ¬A
¬(A ∨ ¬A) ∧ AA ∨ ¬A
¬(A ∨ ¬A) ∧ A⊥
¬(A ∨ ¬A)¬A
¬(A ∨ ¬A)A ∨ ¬A ¬(A ∨ ¬A)¬(A ∨ ¬A)
¬(A ∨ ¬A)⊥
Corollary 2.17. In the symmetrical categorical propositional calculus; the deduction
theorem does not hold.
Remark. In the symmetrical categorical propositional calculus, if the deduction theorem
were satis+ed, so would be its dual: given a derivation of B⊥ where any leaf is either
an axiom or a sequent A⊥ there should be a derivation of BA. Indeed, by duality
there is a proof of B where any leaf is either an axiom, or a sequent A. By the
deduction theorem, there is a derivation of AB; and thus, again by duality, a proof
of BA.
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Proof. Let us consider the following derivation, where the proof of ¬(A ∨ ¬A)⊥ is
the one given in the proof of the previous lemma:
A ∨ ¬A⊥
¬(A ∨ ¬A)
...
¬(A ∨ ¬A)⊥
⊥
By the remark above, if the deduction theorem were satis+ed in the symmetrical cate-
gorical propositional calculus, so would be its dual. Thus let us apply this last property
to the derivation of ⊥ from A ∨ ¬A⊥: it should then exist a derivation of
A∨¬A, which contradicts the conservativity of the symmetrical categorical propo-
sitional calculus over intuitionistic logic.
Remark. The deduction theorem and its dual can be formulated in the form of deduc-
tion rules that discharge some “hypothetic sequent”:
[A]
...
B
AB
[A⊥]
...
B⊥
BA
We saw in the previous proof that adding these rules to the symmetrical categorical
propositional calculus leads to classical logic. For instance, we give here a direct proof
of ¬¬AA:
[A⊥]1
¬A [¬¬A]2
⊥
A (1)
¬¬AA (2)
This calculus extends in fact the Curry–Howard isomorphism to Filinski’s symmetrical
lambda-calculus. Indeed, it is easy to bridge the gap between these deduction rules and
the type system described in [8].
2.6. Weak negation
In intuitionistic logic, it is usual to de+ne the negation ¬A (we will call it intu-
itionistic negation) as A⇒⊥. We then obtain the following rules derived from the
categorical propositional calculus (the axiom is also called the contradiction law):
B∧A⊥
B¬A A∧¬A⊥
The topological and Kripke semantics of the negation are also derived from implication
and absurdity semantics:
<¬A=≡ int(<A=c) and ¬A≡∀¿( A):
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By duality, in subtractive logic, it is possible to de+ne a new negation, denoted ∼,
that we will call weak negation, by ∼A≡ − A (notice that this negation is native
in Rauszer’s work [19]). The bi-topological semantics (i.e. Kripke semantics) of the
weak negation is given by
<∼A=≡ ext(<A=c) and ∼A≡∃6( A):
The weak negation satis+es the following derived rules (the axiom is also called
excluded-middle law for weak negation) dual to those of intuitionistic negation:
A∨B
∼AB ∼A∨A
Remark. Since the intuitionistic negation satis+es the contradiction law and the weak
negation satis+es the excluded-middle law, it is enough to identify these two negations
to obtain classical logic. From the semantics point of view, identifying the interior of
<A=c and the exterior of <A=c amounts to saying that <A= is a clopen set (a set that is
both a closed set and an open set). The set of clopen sets of a bi-topological space is
by de+nition closed under complementation: it thus forms a Boolean algebra.
Before detailing some properties of weak negation, we show that this new connective
is not de+nable from the other intuitionistic connectives. This result, which arises di-
rectly from Corollary 2.19, has as a straightforward consequence the non-de+nability of
subtraction (which can also be obtained as a corollary of Rauszer’s non-conservativity
result in the +rst order framework, see Section 3).
Lemma 2.17. The sequent ¬¬A∨¬A is not derivable in intuitionistic logic; but
it is valid in any Kripke models with a greatest element.
Proof. Let us consider a Kripke model with a greatest element . In this model, either
A or  A. In the +rst case, no  can force ¬A (since 6), therefore any 
forces ¬¬A. In the second case, no  can force A (since 6) and thus any  forces
¬A. In both cases, any  forces ¬¬A∨¬A.
However, the formula ¬¬A∨¬A is not an intuitionistic theorem since it is not valid
in the following model:
Indeed,  does not force ¬A since  force A, and  does not force either ¬¬A since
 force ¬A.
Corollary 2.18 (Dual of Lemma 2.17). The sequent ∼∼ A∧∼A⊥ is not a theorem
of intuitionistic subtractive logic; but it is valid in any Kripke model with a least
element.
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Proof. Indeed, a Kripke model has a least element if and only if its dual has a greatest
element.
Corollary 2.19. Weak negation (and thus subtraction) is not de6nable from the other
connectives in intuitionistic propositional logic.
Remark. Trees are no longer enough to obtain completeness in the presence of weak
negation (and a fortiori in the presence of subtraction).
2.7. Properties of weak negation
We focus here on some properties of weak negation. We justify +rst of all the
terminology of weak negation by showing that it is indeed weaker than the intuitionistic
negation (i.e.  ¬A⇒∼A). The semantical justi+cation is obvious, since for any set
E; int(E)⊂ ext(E). Here is a syntactic proof:
A∨∼A
A∧¬A⊥ ⊥∼A
A∧¬A∼A
A¬A⇒∼A
∼A∧¬A∼A
∼A¬A⇒∼A
A∨∼A¬A⇒∼A
¬A⇒∼A
As a consequence (and by applying duality), one obtains the following implications:
¬∼A∼∼AA¬¬A  ∼¬A
These implications are strict. Indeed, it is known that A¬¬A is a strict implication
(its converse implication gives classical logic), its dual ∼∼AA is thus also strict. In
addition, if the equivalence ¬¬A⇔∼¬A were satisfed, since ¬¬¬A⇔¬A, all formulas
of the following (in+nite) list of implications would be equivalent:
: : : ¬∼¬∼¬∼A¬∼¬∼A¬∼A
Yet these implications are all strict. Indeed, let us take A1 =A and for i¿1:
A2i =∼A2i−1;
A2i+1 =¬A2i :
Now, let us consider the (right) in+nite Kripke model below:
In this model, let us assign to A the set of all nodes except 0 (which is indeed
a +nal section). It is easy to see that the semantics of A2i is {0; : : : ; 2i−1} and the
semantics of A2i+1 is {2i+1; 2i+2; : : :}. The former implications are thus strict.
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2.7.1. Weak negation and intuitionistic implication
We will now use weak negation to approximate intuitionistic implication. The con-
sequence (¬A∨B) (A⇒B) is an usual intuitionistic result, here is some proof of
it:
¬A∧A⊥ ⊥B
¬A∧AB
¬AA⇒B
B∧AB
BA⇒B
¬A∨BA⇒B
Weak negation makes it possible to prove (A⇒B) (∼A∨B). We have already proved
the dual sequent (B∧¬A) (B− A) in Section 2.1. Consequently,
(¬A∨B) (A⇒B) (∼A∨B)
And dually, we obtain the following sequents:
(B∧¬A) (B− A) (B∧∼A)
Again, these implications are strict since on one hand it is clear (take A = B) that
(A⇒B)  (¬A∨B) and on the other hand subtraction is not de+nable from the other
connectives (see Corollary 2.19), therefore (B−A)  (B∧¬A). The other consequences
are strict by duality.
2.8. Equiprovability versus equivalence
It is known that in propositional logic, if A is a classical theorem then ¬¬A is
an intuitionistic theorem. This property does not hold any longer in subtractive logic.
Indeed, we know that ∼A⇒¬A is a classical theorem but not a subtractive theorem.
Moreover, since ⇒¬¬ and ¬¬¬⇒¬ are intuitionistic theorems and ¬¬(⇒  )
is equivalent to ¬¬⇒¬¬ in intuitionistic logic, ¬¬(∼A⇒¬A) is thus equiva-
lent to ¬¬∼A⇒¬¬¬A which is not a subtractive theorem (since ∼A⇒¬¬∼A and
¬¬¬A⇒¬A are subtractive theorems and ∼A⇒¬A is not).
We also know that the axiom A¬∼A leads to classical logic since ¬∼A∼∼A is
derivable (and A∼∼A is dual to ¬¬AA). However, the following striking property
is satis+ed in the symmetrical categorical propositional calculus:
Proposition 2.20. In the symmetrical categorical propositional calculus; if AB is a
theorem then ¬(A−B) is also a theorem. As a special case; if B is a theorem; ¬∼B
is also a theorem.
Proof.
∧ (A− B) (A− B)
AB B⊥∨B
A⊥∨B
(A− B)⊥
∧ (A− B)⊥
¬(A− B)
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Eventually, by taking A= in this proof, we obtain that if B is a theorem then ¬∼B
is also a theorem.
2.9. Unde6nability of subtraction from weak negation
We have already shown that subtraction is not de+nable from the usual intuitionistic
connectives (since weak negation is not, see Corollary 2.19). We prove here that
subtraction is not de+nable either in intuitionistic logic from the usual connectives and
weak negation. The proof of this result which is based on the validity lemma for
Kripke models is a straightforward corollary of the following proposition:
Proposition 2.21. There is a Kripke model interpreting two propositional atoms A
and B in which any formula built from ;⊥; A; B with the connectives ∨;∧;⇒;¬;∼
has a semantics di@erent from the semantics of A− B.
Proof. Let us consider the following Kripke model (the nodes are labelled by the
forced atoms):
The semantics of A− B in this model is
<A− B== ext({; ; }∩ {; }c)= ext({; ; }∩ {; }) = ext({})= {; }
Let us denote by N the set of all nodes. We will show that no other formula built
from , ⊥, A, B with the connectives ∨; ∧; ⇒; ¬; ∼ is interpreted by {; }. For
that, it is enough to show that the set of +nal sections:
E= {∅; {; }; {; ; }; N}
(which are the respective interpretations of ⊥; B; A and ) is closed under the seman-
tics of the connectives ∨; ∧; ⇒; ¬; ∼. Intuitionistic negation is dealt with as a partic-
ular case of implication. Moreover, the set E is clearly closed under union and intersec-
tion. It thus remains to be checked that for any elements U; V; W of E, int(U c∪V ) and
ext(W c) are also elements of E. It is clear in the cases U =V; U = ∅; U =N; V =N;
W = ∅; W =N . The remaining cases are:
• int({; }c ∪∅)= int({; }c) = int({; })= ∅∈E,
• int({; ; }c ∪∅)= int({; ; }c)= int({})= ∅∈E,
• int({; }c ∪{; ; })= int({; }∪ {; ; })= int(N )=N ∈E,
• int({; ; }c ∪{; })= int({}∪ {; })= int({; ; }) = {; }∈E,
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• ext({; }c)= ext({; })=N ∈E,
• ext({; ; }c)= ext({})=N ∈E.
3. First-order subtractive logic
Extending the symmetrical categorical propositional calculus to a +rst-order calculus
does not raise any diQculty, we just take the usual right and left introduction rules
of quanti+ers, restricted to a single formula on both sides of every sequent (terms are
de+ned as usual upon a signature #).
Intro. rules for ∃ (where x does not occur free in C)
BC
∃xBC
A  B[t=x]
A∃xB
Intro. rules for ∀ (where x does not occur free in C)
B[t=x]C
∀xBC
A  B
A∀xB
Notice that the rules for ∃ are exactly dual to those for ∀. Consequently, duality
extends to +rst-order subtractive logic by inverting the quanti+ers ∃ and ∀ (as we will
see it is not the case in usual intuitionistic logic). That means in particular that we
preserve the following property in the +rst-order framework: if AB is derivable then
BA is also derivable. Consequently, since the sequent ∃xA(x)∧B∃x(A(x) ∧ B) is
derivable:
A(x)∧BA(x)∧B
A(x) ∧ B∃x(A(x)∧B)
A(x)B⇒∃x(A(x)∧B)
∃xA(x)B⇒∃x(A(x)∧B)
∃xA(x)∧B∃x(A(x)∧B)
its dual (usually called DIS) ∀x(A(x)∨B)∀xA(x)∨B is also derivable (just take the
dual proof):
A(x)∨BA(x)∨B
∀x(A(x)∨B)A(x)∨B
∀x(A(x)∨B)− BA(x)
∀x(A(x)∨B)− B∀xA(x)
∀x(A(x)∨B)∀xA(x)∨B
However, it is known that this axiom is not intuitionistic. In the +rst-order framework,
subtractive logic is thus not conservative over intuitionistic logic. Let us now consider
this issue from a semantical standpoint.
As a consequence of non-conservativity over intuitionistic logic, we know that the
usual Kripke semantics for +rst-order logic does not extend to subtraction. Naturally,
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we would like to use the interpretation given within the propositional framework. But,
because of the possible growth of the domain, this interpretation is no longer necessarily
well de+ned. A solution to this problem which moreover allows to restore a semantical
duality consists in requiring the domain to be the same in all worlds.
3.1. Constant domain logic (CDL)
Let # be a countable +rst-order language. A constant domain Kripke model is given
by a triple: a preorder (X;6), a #-algebra A and an interpretation I which maps any
n-ary predicate symbol to a function from dom(A)n to the +nal sections of (X;6).
Notation. Given a #-algebra A and an assignment V which maps variables to ele-
ments of dom(A), the notation VA stands for the usual canonical extension of V to
terms.
Denition 3.1 (Kripke’s forcing). Given a preorder (X;6), a #-algebra A and an
interpretation I and an assignment V which maps any free variable of A to some
element of dom(A) we de+ne the forcing relation  V A (where V is an assignment)
by induction on A:
•  V A(t1; : : : ; tn)≡ ∈I(A)(VA(t1); : : : ;VA(tn)) if A is a n-ary predicate symbol,
•  V  and  V⊥,
•  V (A∨B) ≡  V A or  V B;
•  V (A ∧ B) ≡  V A and  V B;
•  V (A⇒B) ≡ for all ¿ ( V A implies  V B);
•  V ∃xA ≡ exists a∈ dom(A) ( V∪{(x; a)} A);
•  V ∀xA ≡ for all a∈ dom(A) ( V∪{(x; a)} A):
Remark. The only diGerence between the de+nition above and the usual Kripke se-
mantics for intuitionistic logic (where the domain of A may grow) lies in the case
of ∀:
 V ∀xA ≡ for all ¿; for all a∈ dom(A) ( V; x:=a A):
Since the domain is constant, if we consider the sets of +nal sections of the preorder
(X;6) as a bitopological space (X;O), we obtain the following presentation of constant
domain Kripke’s semantics:
Denition 3.2 (Bitopological semantics). Given a bitopological space (X;O), a #-
algebra A and an interpretation I, we de+ne the interpretation <A=V (where V is
an assignment) of a formula A by induction:
• <A(t1; : : : ; tn)=V ≡ I(A)(VA(t1); : : : ;VA(tn)) if A is a n-ary predicate symbol,
• <=V ≡ X , <⊥= ≡ ∅;
• <A ∧ B=V ≡ <A=V ∩ <B=V;
• <A∨B=V ≡ <A=V ∪ <B=V;
• <A⇒B=V ≡ int(<A=cV ∪ <B=V);
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• <∃xA=V ≡
⋃
a∈dom(A) <A=V∪{(x; a)};
• <∀xA=V ≡
⋂
a∈dom(A) <A=V∪{(x; a)}:
This semantics de+nes the so-called constant domain logic (CDL). One of the well-
known results in model theory of intuitionistic logic states that the theory containing
the axiom scheme DIS is complete for CDL [9, 16].
Theorem 3.3 (Soundness and completeness). A formula is intuitionistically provable
in the 6rst order theory DIS i@ it is valid in all constant domain Kripke models.
3.2. Kripke semantics for 6rst-order subtractive logic
We now consider subtractive logic as an extension of CDL where the semantics of
subtraction is exactly the one given in the propositional framework:
 V (A− B) ≡ exists 6( VA and  VB):
For this semantics, Rauszer proved the soundness and completeness theorems [20].
Theorem 3.4 (Soundness and completeness). A formula is provable in 6rst-order sub-
tractive logic i@ it is valid in all constant domain Kripke models.
As in the propositional framework, since the subtraction is interpreted directly in
CDL’s models, we obtain the conservativity as a corollary.
Theorem 3.5 (Conservativity). Subtractive logic is conservative over CDL.
4. Embedding classical logic into subtractive logic
In the classical sequent calculus LK of Gentzen [21], it is possible to derive the
following proof of the excluded-middle law:
A  A
A  ⊥; A
 ¬A; A
This proof is corrupted (from an intuitionistic point of view) for the following reason:
we discharge an assumption (A) on some conclusion (⊥) whereas another conclusion
(A) depends clearly on the assumption that is being discharged.
The rule in question is the right introduction of implication (or the intuitionistic
negation), in the presence of multiple conclusions. In Section 4.5, we show that weak
negation (studied in the previous chapter) enables to de+ne a weak implication for
which precisely the right introduction rule in the presence of multiple conclusions is
derivable in intuitionistic subtractive logic. In addition, we de+ne (in Section 4.5)
a translation, using bi-topological semantics, from classical propositional logic into
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propositional intuitionistic subtractive logic. We also show that this translation ex-
tends directly to cut-free proofs of the sequent calculus LK. We notice then that any
“classical” occurrence of the right introduction rule of implication (resp. negation)
is translated into some occurrence of the right introduction rule of weak implica-
tion (resp. negation). When the whole proof has been translated, no occurrence of
the right introduction rule of implication remains: the proof obtained is then clearly
subtractive.
4.1. The classical calculus LK
We +rst recall the rules of Gentzen sequent calculus LK (see [12] for example).
Again rules for subtraction are obtained by duality (the calculus obtained is called
SLK). However, we can show here that there is a unique (classical) negation (i.e.
intuitionistic negation and weak negation are provably equivalent) and that subtraction
is de+nable from the classical negation, denoted by A⊥; by A − B ≡ A ∧ B⊥ (just as
implication is de+nable by A⇒B ≡ A⊥ ∨B). Notice that if we take now ¬A ≡ A⇒⊥
and ∼A ≡ −A we obtain derived rules, which are exactly the same as those de+ning
classical negation.
Axiom
A  A
Cut rule
,  -; A ,′; A  -′
,; ,′  -; -′
Contraction rules
,  -; A; A
,  -; A
,; A; A  -
,; A  -
Weakening rules
,  -
,  -; A
,  -
,; A  -
Exchange rules
,  -; A; B; -′
,  -; B; A; -′
,; A; B; ,′  -
,; B; A; ,′  -
Rules for ⊥ and 
,  -;⊥
,  -; A
,;  -
,; A  -
176 T. Crolard / Theoretical Computer Science 254 (2001) 151–185
Rules for classical negation
,  -; A
,; A⊥  -
,; A  -
,  -; A⊥
Intro. rules for ∧
,; A  -
,; A ∧ B  -
,; B  -
,; A ∧ B  -
,  -; A ,′  -′; B
,; ,′  -; -′; A ∧ B
Intro. rules for ∨
,; A  - ,′; B  -′
,; ,′; A∨B  -; -′
,  -; A
,  -; A∨B
,  -; B
,  -; A∨B
Right intro. rules for ⇒
,; B  - ,′  -′; A
,; ,′; A⇒B  -; -′
,; A  -; B
,  -; A⇒B
Intro. rules for ∃ (if x does not occur free in ,; -)
,; A  -
,;∃xA  -
,′  -′; B[t=x]
,′  -′;∃xB
Intro. rules for ∀ (if x does not occur free in ,′; -′)
,; A[t=x]  -
,;∀xA  -
,′  -′; B
,′  -′;∀xB
Remark. It is possible to give another formulation of the rules which require that
upper sequents have the same contexts (additive rules). It is well known that this
formulation is equivalent to the one presented above, it is enough to apply a few times
the weakening rules and the contraction rules to show the equivalence. We will use
equally both formulations.
4.2. The classical calculus SLK
The rules for subtraction are obtained by duality from the rules for implication. As
expected, we thus obtain rules for a sequent calculus, since they are left and right
introduction rules.
Right intro. rule of −
,  -; A ,′; B  -′
,; ,′  -; -′; A− B
Left intro. rule of −
,; A  -; B
,; A− B  -
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Remark. Just like implication internalizes the deduction symbol  on the right (as a
conclusion), subtraction internalizes the deduction symbol  on the left (as an hypoth-
esis). More speci+cally, the following rules are derivable:
,  A⇒B; -
,; A  B; -
,; A− B  -
,; A  B; -
Indeed,
,  A⇒B; -
B  B A  A
A; A⇒B  B
,; A  B; -
A  A B  B
A  B; A− B ,; A− B  -
,; A  B; -
4.2.1. About sequents with multiple conclusions
The sequent calculus was introduced by G. Gentzen for a very speci+c purpose:
to prove the cut elimination theorem. This system had much success thereafter since
it allows a precise analysis of computational contents, in particular in classical logic
(like the system LC [10] for instance). It is also often claimed that this presentation is
somehow minimal: each connective is de+ned by its introduction rules, independently
of the other connectives. This is not the case in the categorical calculus since the
de+nition of implication is based on the conjunction (and the de+nition of subtraction
is based on disjunction). However, the minimalist character of this presentation is
misleading. Indeed, if we consider for example the fragment of the calculus containing
only the conjunction and disjunction connectives, it is possible to derive the following
proof:
B  B C  C
B; C  B ∧ C
B; C  (B ∧ C)∨ (B ∧ A)
B  B A  A
B; A  B ∧ A
B; A  (B ∧ C)∨ (B ∧ A)
B; C ∨A  (B ∧ C)∨ (B ∧ A)
B ∧ (C ∨A)  (B ∧ C)∨ (B ∧ A)
whereas it is known that any lattice is not necessarily distributive. The rules for con-
junction and disjunction in LK are thus more powerful than those of the categorical
calculus (again, only if we con+ne ourselves to the fragments of these calculi containing
only the conjunction and the disjunction). Actually, we used an implicit distributivity
law contained in the structural rules which axiomatize the left comma (which repre-
sents also a conjunction). Notice that this proof is intuitionistic (the sequents have only
one conclusion) and may be translated in natural deduction.
Another example, DIS, that we can prove thanks to subtraction but which is not an
intuitionistic theorem (see Section 3) is now provable without subtraction.
Remark. We will use in the proof of DIS these derived rules for ∨ :
,  -; A; B
,  -; A∨B
,  -; A∨B
,  -; A; B
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Proposition 4.1. The axioms scheme DIS is provable in LK using only the structural
rules and the rules for ∨ and ∀.
Proof.
A(x)∨B  A(x)∨B
∀x(A(x)∨B)  A(x)∨B
∀x(A(x)∨B)  A(x); B
∀x(A(x)∨B)  ∀xA(x); B
∀x(A(x)∨B)  ∀xA(x)∨B
4.3. Intuitionistic restrictions of LK
In propositional logic, LK can be restricted to intuitionistic calculi in several ways.
• The most famous restriction is obtained by limiting the sequents to at most one
conclusion: this is LJ (see [21], for example). However the rules of subtraction
restricted in this way:
,  A ,′; B 
,; ,′  A− B
,; A  B
,; A− B 
do not de+ne any more the subtraction previously studied. Indeed, we can then
derive:
B  B
B; A  B
B; A− B 
A− B  ¬B
and in particular ∼B  ¬B which is not valid in intuitionistic subtractive logic.
Duality suggests the constraint to use if we want to stay in the intuitionistic frame-
work: it is necessary to restrict the sequents to at most one hypothesis. But this
restriction gives us a degenerated calculus or brings us back to the symmetrical
categorical calculus.
• A weaker restriction of LK to an intuitionistic calculus consists in restricting only the
right introduction rule of implication to a unique conclusion. It is known [6, 7] that
this propositional calculus is conservative over intuitionistic propositional logic, we
will call it LK1. On the other hand, in the +rst-order framework LK1 is conservative
over DIS-logic (we already gave the proof of DIS, see Proposition 4.1).
By duality, this restriction extends of course to the left introduction rule of sub-
traction: the upper sequent of the rule must have only one hypothesis. The calculus
thus obtained is conservative over subtractive logic (see Proposition 4.3), it will be
called SLK1.
4.4. The subtractive calculus SLK1
The rules of this calculus are those of SLK where the rules for implication and
subtraction are replaced by the following ones (and the classical negation is removed):
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Intro. rules for ⇒
,; B  - ,′  -′; A
,; ,′; A⇒B  -; -′
,; B  A
,  B⇒A
Intro. rules for −
A  -; B
A− B  -
,  -; A ,′; B  -′
,; ,′  -; -′; A− B
Again, we obtain the derived rules (that are diGerent this time) for intuitionistic
negation ¬A ≡ A⇒⊥ and weak negation ∼A ≡ − A:
Derived intro. rule of ¬
,  -; A
,;¬A  -
,; A 
,  ¬A
Derived intro. rule of ∼
 A; -
∼A  -
,; A  -
,  ∼A; -
4.4.1. Embedding SLK1 into the categorical calculus
We show in this section that the (resp. subtractive) propositional calculus LK1 is
conservative over the (resp. symmetrical) categorical propositional calculus, and that
the +rst order calculus SLK1 is conservative over the +rst-order symmetrical categorical
calculus.
Notation. If ,  - is the sequent ,1; ,2; : : :n  -1; -2; : : : ; -m, the notation ,∧  -∨
is an abbreviation for (: : : ((,1 ∧ ,2) ∧ · · · ∧ ,n)  (: : : ((-1 ∨-2)∨ · · · ∨-m)
Proposition 4.2. A propositional sequent ,  - is derivable in SLK1 i@ ,∧-∨ is
derivable in the symmetrical categorical propositional calculus.
Proof. By induction on the derivation, directly for the introduction rules of ; ∧,
and ⇒ and by duality for ⊥; ∨ , and −. In fact, the constraints on SLK1 are needed
only to derive the translation of the right introduction rule of implication and the left
introduction rule of subtraction, and precisely theses rules are translated into themselves
(see [2] for further details).
Proposition 4.3. A 6rst-order sequent ,  - is derivable in SLK1 then ,∧  -∨ i@
it is derivable in the ( 6rst order) symmetrical categorical propositional calculus.
Proof. The only tricky case is the translation of the rules for ∀ and ∃ from SLK1 into
the +rst-order symmetrical categorical propositional calculus. Let us treat the case of
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∀ (where x occurs neither in , nor in - in the right introduction rule):
,∧  A∨-∨
,∧  -∨ ∨∀xA
,∧ ∧ A[t=x]  -∨
,∧ ∧ ∀xA  -∨
can be derived as follows:
,∧  A∨-∨
,∧ − -∨  A
,∧ − -∨  ∀xA
,∧  -∨ ∨∀xA
,∧ ∧ A[t=x]  -∨
A[t=x]  ,∧⇒-∨
∀xA  ,∧⇒-∨
,∧ ∧ ∀xA  -∨
The rules for ∃ are obtained as usual by duality.
Corollary 4.4. In the 6rst-order framework; the calculus SLK1 is conservative over
the calculus LK1.
Proof. Indeed, SLK1 and LK1 both allow to prove DIS (see Proposition 4.1) but are
also both conservative over the +rst-order symmetrical categorical calculus.
4.5. Embedding LK into SLK1
In any bi-topological space O on X , given a valuation V, it is possible to give
(independently of its bi-topological interpretation) the classical interpretation of a for-
mula A on P(X ) seen as a boolean algebra. In addition, we saw that the interpretation
of the negation led to two bi-topological semantics (the interior or the exterior of the
complement) which approximate upwards and downwards the interpretation of clas-
sical negation (i.e. the complement). This property extends to the other connectives:
the interior and the exterior of the classical semantics of a connective can always
be rephrased as the intuitionistic semantics of the same connective (or some derived
connectives). For instance, the interior of the classical semantics of the implication is
exactly the intuitionistic semantics of implication, whereas the exterior of the seman-
tics of implication is exactly the intuitionistic semantics of weak implication de+ned
by A B ≡ ∼A∨B (since ext(Ac ∪B)= ext(Ac)∪B).
This observation leads us to the following question: could we inductively map to
any formula A, two new formulas A− and A+ whose topological semantics surround
the most accurately the classical interpretation of A? We here answer this question
by de+ning a translation of (subtractive) classical propositional logic into propositional
subtractive logic. Then we show that this translation extends directly to cut-free proofs
of the sequent calculus LK.
4.6. Translation of formulas
We de+ne the following translation of the classical propositional formulas into sub-
tractive propositional formulas. We denote by − the translation that decreases the
bi-topological interpretation of the formula whereas we denote by + the translation
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that increases it. The classical negation of A is again denoted by A⊥.
A− ≡ A; if A is an atom;
(A ∧ B)− ≡ A− ∧ B−;
(A∨B)− ≡ A− ∨B−;
(A⇒B)− ≡ A+⇒B−;
(A− B)− ≡ A− ∧ ¬B+;
(A⊥)− ≡ ¬A+;
A+ ≡ A; if A is an atom;
(A ∧ B)+ ≡ A+ ∧ B+;
(A∨B)+ ≡ A+ ∨B+;
(A⇒B)+ ≡ ∼A− ∨B+;
(A− B)+ ≡ A+ − B−;
(A⊥)+ ≡ ∼A−:
Remark. The translation of subtraction is given here to reveal the symmetry between
the two translations. It is known that in classical logic, any propositional formula is
equivalent, for example, with a formula containing only conjunctions and negations.
However such formulas are provable in classical logic if and only if they are provable in
intuitionistic logic. Thus a translation is interesting only when it is faithful. According
to this criterion, if we consider a formula not containing any subtraction, this translation
just substitutes any classical negation (resp. implication) by a weak or intuitionistic
negation (resp. implication) according to its occurrence (either positive or negative) in
the original formula.
Example. We recall that weak implication is de+ned by A B=∼A∨B.
• the translation of the axiom A⊥⊥⇒A is (A⊥⊥)− A+≡¬∼A A,
• the translation of Peirce axiom ((A⇒B)⇒A)⇒A is: ((A⇒B)⇒A)− A+≡
((A⇒B)+⇒A) A≡ ((A B)⇒A) A,
• the translation of A⊥⊥ A is ¬∼AA,
• the translation of ((A⇒B)⇒A)A is ((A B)⇒A)A.
Denition 4.5. Given a set X and an assignment V on P(X ), we denote by <A=K the
interpretation of A in the boolean algebra of subsets of X . More speci+cally, for any
propositional formula A (possibly containing subtractions):
• <A=K =V(A) if A is an atom,
• <A∧B=K = <A=K ∩ <B=K ,
• <A∨B=K = <A=K ∪ <B=K ,
• <A⇒B=K =(<A=K)c ∪ <B=K ,
• <A− B=K = <A=K ∩ (<B=K)c,
• <A⊥=K =(<A=K)c.
Of course, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4.6. For any propositional formula A; we have A+⇔A⇔A− in classical
logic (where A− B≡A∧B⊥ and ∼ A≡A⊥).
Proof. It is easy to check that <A−=K = <A=K = <A+=K .
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Theorem 4.7. If a sequent AB is valid in classical logic; then A− B+ is valid in
intuitionistic subtractive logic.
Proof. By induction on the formula, we show that for any bi-topological space O on
a set X , any (intuitionistic) assignment V on O:
<A−=O⊂ <A=K ⊂ <A+=O:
Indeed:
• If A is an atom then A−=A=A+ and <A=K = <A=O=V(A).
• <(A∧B)−=O= <A− ∧B−=O= <A−=O ∩ <B−=O⊂ <A=K ∩ <B=K
= <A∧B=k ⊂ <A+=O ∩ <B+=O= <A+ ∧B+=O= <(A∧B)+=O.
• <(A⇒B)−=O= <A+⇒B−=O= int(<A+=c ∪ <B−=)⊂ <A+=c ∪ <B−=
⊂ (<A=K)c ∪ <B=K = <A⇒B=K ⊂ (<A−=cO ∪ <B+=O)⊂ ext(<A−=cO ∪ <B+=O)
= ext(<A−=cO)∪ <B+=O= <∼A− ∨B+=O= <(A⇒B)+=O.
• <(A⊥)−=O= <¬A+=O= int(<A+=c)⊂ (<A=K)c = <A⊥=K ⊂ <A−=cO
⊂ ext(<A−=cO)= <∼A−=O.
The other cases are obtained by duality. We deduce then that if for any classical as-
signment <A=K ⊂ <B=K then for any intuitionistic assignment <A−=O⊂ <A=K ⊂ <B=K ⊂ <B+=O
and thus A− B+ is valid in intuitionistic logic.
Corollary 4.8. If a formula A is a classical tautology; then A+ is an intuitionistic
tautology.
4.7. Translation of proofs
We show in this section that any cut-free proof , - of LK can be turned into a
(cut-free) proof of ,+ -− in SLK1.
Lemma 4.7. In SLK1; it is possible to derive the following rule:
,; AB; -
, A B; -
Proof.
,; A-; B
,  ∼A; B; -
,  ∼A∨B; -
Lemma 4.8. For any formula A; the sequent A− A+ is derivable in SLK1.
Proof. By induction on the formula A. The only non-trivial case is the case of im-
plication. Let us assume that A−  SLK1A+ and B−  SLK1B+ and let us show that
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(A⇒B)−  SLK1(A⇒B)+:
...
...
A− A+ B− B+
A−; A+⇒B− B+
A+⇒B− ∼A−; B+
A+⇒B− ∼A− ∨B+
Theorem 4.9. It is possible to translate any cut-free proof in LK of a sequent , -;
into a (cut-free) proof in SLK1 of the sequent ,− -+ in the following way: translate
each occurence of an axiom AA; by a proof in SLK1 of A− A+; each occurrence of
the left or right introduction rule of the classical negation respectively by the derived
rules:
,; A-
, ∼A; -
, A; -
,;¬A-
and eventually each occurence of the right introduction rule of implication by the
derived rule:
,; AB; -
, A B; -
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the derivation of ,  LK-. An axiom AA,
by construction, is replaced by a proof of A−  SLK1A+ (see Lemma 4.8). The translation
of an instance of a rule of LK is either already an instance of a rule of SLK1 or an
instance of the derived rule given by the translation. For example, the translation of
an instance of the right introduction rule of implication gives:
,−; A− B+; -+
,− A− B+; -+
and precisely A− B+ =∼A− ∨B+ = (A⇒B)+.
Remark. The restriction to cut-free proofs is justi+ed by the fact that an instance of
the cut-rule:
, A; - ,′; A-′
,; ,′ -; -′
is translated into the following instance, which is no longer an instance of the cut rule:
,− A+; -+ ,′−; A− -′+
,−; ,′− -+; -′+
Of course, due to cut-elimination in LK, this translation is still valid.
4.8. First-order logic
The translation extends directly to +rst-order logic. However, we point out that in
+rst-order logic, DIS is provable in the calculus SLK1 (see Proposition 4.1).
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Consequently, the translation presented here is from +rst-order classical logic into +rst-
order subtractive logic.
(∀xA)−≡∀xA−; (∀xA)+≡∀xA+;
(∃xA)−≡∃xA−; (∃xA)+≡∃xA+:
Theorem 4.10. Given a cut-free proof of , -; in 6rst-order LK; the proof obtained
by applying the translation described in the statement of Theorem 4.5 is a (cut-free)
proof in SLK1 of the 6rst-order sequent ,− -+.
Remark. This translation of cut-free proofs of LK extends by duality to cut-free proofs
of SLK. However, although we conjecture cut-elimination in SLK, we did not consider
this issue in this paper.
4.9. Future work
In this paper, we have not considered computational issues. Although bi-[CCC] are
degenerated, it is possible to weaken the equational theory (see [8] for an interpretation
of weak initial and +nal objects in terms of lazy and eager evaluation) and to study
corresponding rewriting systems.
Various conOuent rewriting systems, based on categorical combinators and in which
-calculus can be simulated, are known (see [13, Section 4.4]). However, extending
this result to bi-[CCC] combinators, involve +rst to solve this problem in bi-cartesian
closed categories (i.e. with co-product but without co-exponent) which already seems
to raise diQculties [5]. Moreover, Mellies [15] proved that some systems of categorical
combinators, with extensionality rules, even in a typed framework, does not satisfy the
normalization property. The proof of this result is obtained by de+ning a +xed point
using categorical combinators, exactly in the same way as in some -calculus with
explicit substitutions.
Besides, we have shown that there is no functionnal completeness in bi-[CCC].
Consequently, if we want to de+ne some -calculus whose type system corresponds
to subtractive logic, we need to restrict the -abstraction (i.e. the right introduction
rule of implication) of some classical -calculus. A forthcoming paper will be devoted
to this subject (where we will use Parigot’s 0-calculus [17, 18] whose computational
properties are better known than those of Filinski’s symmetrical -calculus).
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